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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted of burglary, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953), as 
amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried and convicted without a jury on 
February 13, 1981 in the Second Judicial District Court before 
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist. On February 27, 1981 appellant 
was sentenced to 1-15 years at the Utah State Prison. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the judgment and 
sentence rendered by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 30, 1980, Wayne Vandenakker reported to 
Washington Terrace Police in Weber County that his home had 
been burglarized (T.10). When police investigated the scene, 
Mr. Vandenakker told them the names of individuals who 
regularly were around the house (T.29). That same day, Officer 
Richard Cope and Officer Dean Jensen questioned appellant at 
the Washington Terrace City building concerning the burglary 
(T.29,50,85). Officer Cope, before questioning appellant, 
advised him of his Miranda rights (T.29). After indicating 
that he understood his rights (T.29), appellant discussed with 
Officer Cope the burglary and his activities on April 29th, 
the day of the burglary (T.30-31). 
During the interrogation, which lasted about 1 1/2 
hours, the police asked appellant if he would take a polygraph 
test; however, they informed him that he had a right to refuse 
(T.44-49). Appellant did refuse to take the polygraph on this 
and other occasions (T.102). 
Appellant did not confess during this initial 
interrogation (T.31). However, approximately thirty minutes 
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after he was allowed to leave, the police received a call 
from an unknown individual, who stated that there was a 
package for Officer Cope in a garbage bin of a local business 
(T.32). Officer Cope retrieved the package and found some 
of the missing items from the Vandenakker house (T.33,34). 
On May 1, 1980,0fficer Cope briefly talked with 
appellant at his home concerning the burglary. Appellant 
again reiterated that he had no information concerning the 
crime (T.40). 
On May 8, 1980, appellant voluntarily came to the 
police station, where the police conducted a third interrogation 
(T.46,54). Four policemen; Officer Cope, Officer Jensen, 
Sergeant Powell and Chief Tracey; conducted the interrogation, 
each of the officers taking turns questioning the appellant 
(T.47). During this interview, which lasted about one hour 
and forty five minutes (T.46), Officer Jensen told appellant 
that they would try and work something out with the County 
Attorney if he would talk (T.86). Appellant responded that 
he did not commit the burglary and that he did not want to 
talk about it at all (T.88). The officers withdrew their 
offer to talk with the County Attorney and allowed appellant 
to leave (T.88). 
There are a couple of references to a fourth 
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interrogation in the record, but no evidence concerning a 
fourth interrogation was ever brought out (T.50,55). 
Officer Cope testified that he never gave appellant 
any promises in return for a confession (T. 55) nor did he ever 
threaten appellant (T.51). He also testified that appellant 
never confessed during any of these sessions (T.55). 
From May to November of 1980 the only other contact 
the Washington Terrace Police had with appellant was by Officer 
Jensen, who stopped appellant a couple of times on traffic 
violations in August or September (T. 89). Officer Jensen told 
appellant he would like to talk and that maybe he could do 
something about the traffic citations. When appellant said he 
did not corrunit the burglary, Officer Jensen followed through 
with the citation (T.89). Officer Jensen also indicates that 
on one occasion he talked to appellant and asked him to take a 
polygraph. Appellant, as he had done in the past, refused to 
take the test (T.101). 
On November 3, 1980,Appellant was taken into custody 
and interrogated by the Ogden City Police on an Ogden City 
case (T.59). Following appellant's arrest he was taken to the 
police station, where he was interrogated by Officer Afuvai 
(T.59). Prior to this interrogation, Officer Afuvai advised 
appellant of his Miranda rights (T.59). Appellant said that 
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he was aware of his rights and he discussed the Ogden City 
case with Officer Afuvai (T.59). 
During this interrogation, Officer Afuvai offered 
to drop three outstanding charges against appellant in connection 
with the Ogden City case (T.60,61,66). However, no promises 
were ever given appellant in exchange for his confession on 
the Washington Terrace case (T.61). 
After appellant had confessed in the Ogden city case 
and signed a written confession, Officer Afuvai began question-
ing him about the Wasington Terrace case (T.61). Appellant 
told Officer Afuvai that he had broken into the Vandenakker 
house on the 29th of April and had taken some of the missing 
property and that he had left the stolen property in a garbage 
bin for Officer Cope (T.62,63). 
This interrogation lasted about four hours (T.62). 
Officer Afuvai testified that he may have raised his voice 
during the interrogation, but that the atmosphere was peaceful 
and he never cajoled or threatened the appellant (T.64,67,68, 
80,83). Officer Afuvai also testified that appellant never 
tried to stop while he was confessing (T.64). 
The record also indicates that Officer Afuvai had 
questioned appellant prior to the interrogation that led to 
his confession (T.68). Officer Afuvai stated that he had 
questioned appellant two or three times while appellant was in 
jail, that some of these interrogations involved the Washington 
-5-
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Terrace case, and that appellant had been advised of his 
Miranda rights at the jail (T.68). 
Appellant contradicts some of Officer Afuvai's 
testimony. He alleges that Officer Afuvai promised to drop 
certain charges if he confessed (T.110,111) and he 
testified that Officer Afuvai threatened him by hitching 
up his pants and stating, "You're causing me to lose my 
composure." (T.111). 
A week after appellant confessed to Officer Afuvai, 
he also confessed to Officer Jensen of the Washington 
Terrace Police (T.93). The trial court ruled this confession 
inadmissible on the grounds that the defendant believed 
it was an off the record discussion. The court also found 
that appellant confessed in order to pacify the police officers. 




APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY CONFESSED TO THE 
WASHINGTON TERRACE BURGLARY. 
The voluntariness of a confession is determined by 
reviewing all of the circumstances under which the confession 
was made. State v. Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 73, 513 P.2d 435 (1973). 
This Court has stated that it will not disturb the trial 
court's ruling on this issue if there is substantial evidence 
-6-
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to support it. State v. Allen, 29 Utah 2d 88, 505 P.2d 302 
(1973). This rule remains the same even though the evidence 
presented at trial is conflicting. Palfreyroan v. Bates and 
Rogers Const. Co., 108 Utah 142, 158 P.2d 132 (1945). Clearly, 
the trial court is in the best position to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses and to determine what weight 
should be given to their testimonies. On appeal, the evidence 
should be viewed in the light most favorable to the lower court's 
judgment. Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 512 (Utah 1980). 
In State v. Watkins, 219 Kan. 81, 547 P.2d 810 (1976), 
the court listed the following factors as bearing on the issue 
of voluntariness: 
. The duration and manner of inter-
rogation; the ability of the accused on request 
to communicate with the outside world; the 
accused age, intellect and background; and the 
fairness of the officers in conducting the 
interrogation ... Generally if the accused 
was not deprived of his free choice to admit, 
deny or refuse to answer, the statement may be 
considered voluntary. 
Id. at 824 (citation omitted). 
In addition to the above facts the court in Watkins 
pointed to the numerous Miranda warnings the defendant had 
received in ruling the confession was voluntary. The Miranda 
warning is designed to assure that a confession is voluntary 
and to inform the defendant of his right to remain silent 
and his right to have counsel present during questioning. 
-7-
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Even though proof that the Miranda warning was given is 
not dispositve of the issue of voluntariness (State v. 
Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977)), it clearly is some 
indication the confession was the product of the defendant's 
free and rational choice. 
In Watkins the court considered the following 
facts with reference to the voluntariness of the defendant's 
confession. The defendant was taken to the district attorney's 
office at about 3:00 p.m. and placed in the library with 
another suspect, who had told the district attorney that 
he could get the defendant to tell the truth. The police 
were aware that this individual had fought with the defendant 
earlier in the day. One hour later the police began an inter· 
rogation of the defendant which lasted four hours. During the 
course of the interrogation the defendant implicated another 
individual, who was brought in to confront the defendant. 
Both individuals became hostile and an argument ensued. 
Later, a police officer moved close to the defendant and told 
him it was "all over" and "it was time to face up to it." 
Shortly thereafter the defendant confessed. 
The court in Watkins found some of the police cond~t 
questionable. Nevertheless, the court found the confession 
was admissible because it was the product of a "free will and 
independent mind." 
-8-
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The evidence in the instant case establishes that 
appellant's confession was voluntary. When appellant 
confessed to Officer Afuvai, he knew that he had a right to 
remain silent and to have counsel present. Appellant has 
been convicted of several felonies (T.118). With this 
criminal experience, appellant knew that the police had to 
follow certain procedures in conducting an interrogation. 
The record also contains numerous accounts of appellant 
being advised of his Miranda rights (T.29,59,68). When 
interrogated by the Washington Terrace police, appellant 
stated he understood his Miranda and still he talked with 
the police and denied any complicity in the burglary (T.30). 
Appellant never seemed to be intimidated by the police. 
During the third interrogation with the lvashington Terrace 
Police, appellant told them he had not committed the burglary 
and he did not want to talk about it. The police then allowed 
appellant to leave (T.88). 
When appellant was interrogated by Officer Afuvai 
a number of factors may have influenced him to confess. He 
had just been arrested and placed in jail (T.60,68). The 
evidence against him for drug possession, driving with a 
revoked license, and for theft in an Ogden City case was 
extremely strong. Finally, appellant's confession in the 
Ogden City case may have reduced his resistance and made 
him more susceptible to confessing. 
-9-
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During the interrogation appellant never asked to 
see anyone, nor did he ever decline to discuss the case with 
Officer Afuvai. 
Officer Afuvai testified that he never threatened 
or cajoled the defendant, nor was the confession made pursuant 
to any promises. He testified that the interrogation, which 
lasted about four hours, was peaceful (T.64,67,68,80,83). 
Appellant claims that Officer Afuvai is 5 foot 10 
inches and 270 pounds (appellant's brief, page 11). This 
information is not found in the record and cannot be verified. 
The only reference to Officer Afuvai's size is that he is 
an imposing figure (T.82). Therefore, respondent submits that 
this information is not properly before the court and it should 
not be considered. 
Appellant infers in his brief that the interroga-
tions conducted by the Washington Terrace Police had a 
cumulative effect upon him. However, respondent maintains 
that the interrogations conducted by the Washington Terrace 
Police were too far removed in time from the interrogation 
that led to appellant's confession to have had any coercive 
effect upon him. 
Appellant also claims that other actions taken by 
the police violated his rights. Respondent submits that many 
of the techniques used by the police to elicit information 
from a defendant are not proscribed by Miranda. The police 
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are not required to talk in monotones or to maintain 
complete neutrality in conducting an interrogation. 
The mere fact appellant confessed, when he 
knew his confession could be used against him, is not 
proof that his confession was involuntary. As the 
Supreme Court said in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 
U.S. 568 (1961): 
A confession is not always 
the result of an overborne will. The 
police may be a midwife to a declaration 
born of remorse, relief, or desperation, 
or calculation. 
Id. at 576. 
In the instant case the trial court found that 
appellant confessed to pacify the officers (T.131). 
However, appellant's confession is not rendered involuntary 
by the fact that he was motivated by a desire to appease 
Officer Afuvai. This desire and appellant's free will could 
coexist at the same time. 
Respondent maintains that appellant was not deprived 
of his free choice. Appellant knew what his rights were; he 
knew that he could decline to discuss the case further and he 
knew he could ask for counsel. Appellant clearly had the 
choice to confess or to invoke his rights, and he chose to 
confess. 
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POINT II 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT INVOKED 
HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, NOR IS THERE 
AN ABSOLUTE PROSCRIPTION AGAINST RESUMING 
QUESTIONING ONCE THAT RIGHT HAS BEEN INVOKED. 
There is no evidence in the instant case which 
establishes appellant invoked his right to remain silent. 
Appellant postulates from the following facts that this 
right was invoked. Officer Afuvai questioned appellant 
three or four times on the day he was arrested. Two 
of the sessions involved the Washington Terrace burglary, 
while the other sessions involved other cases. Finally, 
Officer Afuvai advised appellant of his Miranda rights two 
times during the course of these interrogations (T.68). 
Appellant's counsel speculates that since appellant was 
questioned and advised of his rights on two occasions, that he 
must have initially refused to discuss the case with Officer 
Aluvai. 
To adopt appellant's position would be improper. 
Appellant's counsel is merely speculating that appellant 
invoked his right to remain silent. There is no evidence in 
the record which would support the conclusion. It is fundamental 
that this court will not rule on evidence which is not supported 
by the record. 
The fallacy of appellant's argument, that since 
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Officer Afuvai gave appellant two separate Miranda warnings 
appellant must have initially declined to discuss the case, 
is also apparent. 
The mere fact Officer Afuvai talked with appellant 
more than once does not necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that appellant invoked his right to remain silent. 
Appellant could have talked with Officer Afuvai, but 
claimed he was innocent. He had done this on prior occasions 
with the Washington Terrace Police (T.31,40). If this were 
the case, subsequent questioning would not have been improper. 
In support of his claim that once the right to remain 
silent has been invoked the police are proscribed from 
resuming questioning, appellant cites People v. Pettingill, 578 
P.2d 108 (Calif. 1978). In Pettingill, the police on two separate 
occasions gave the defendant a Miranda warning and asked him 
if he would discuss the case. The appellant on both occasions 
refused. Three days after the arrest a third interrogation 
was initiated by a new officer after a fresh Miranda warning 
had been given the defendant. In this interrogation the 
defendant confessed. The instant case is easily distinguishable 
from Pettingill because here there is no evidence that appellant 
invoked his right to remain silent. 
The position taken by California in Pettingill was 
rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Michigan v. 
Moseley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). In Mosely the court held that 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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under certain circumstances, where the right to cut off 
interrogation has been "scrupulously honored," police can 
resume questioning without violating the defendant's 
constitutional rights. Respondent maintains that in this 
case it would be improper to decide this issue because there 
is no evidence that appellant ever invoked his right to 
remain silent. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S CONFESSION WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED 
INTO THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE APPELLANT WAS 
ADVISED OF AND WAIVED HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS. 
Once a defendant is fully appraised of his/her 
rights, and those rights are intelligently waived, the police 
are not required to repeat those rights each time questioning 
is commenced. People v. Hill, 39 Ill.2d 125, 233 N.E.2d 367, 
U.S. cert. den.392 U.S. 396 (1968); State v. Dixon, 489 P.2d 
225 (Ariz. 1971); Biddy v. Diamond, 516 F.2d 118, U.S. 
cert. den. 425 U.S. 950 (1975). 
The evidence establishes that appellant was aware 
of his Miranda rights when he confessed to the crime in this 
case. Appellant has been convicted of several felonies (T.118) 
From this fact a general understanding of the criminal justice 
system can be ascribed to appellant. During the course of the 
investigation in the instant case, appellant was advised of his 
Miranda rights by the Washington Terrace Police and he 
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discussed the case without confessing (T.29-31). On one 
occasion appellant even invoked his right to remain 
silent by declining to talk to the police '(T.88). Just 
prior to the interrogation that led to appellant's 
confession, Officer Afuvai again gave appellant his 
Miranda rights and appellant said he was aware of them 
(T.59). In this interrogation the questioning initially 
dealt with the Ogden City case. After appellant confessed 
in that case, Officer Afuvai began questioning appellant 
about the Vandanakker burglary. These facts clearly 
establish that appellant was aware of his Miranda rights 
when he confessed to the Vandanakker burglary, that he knew 
he could invoke his rights and that Officer Afuvai was not 
obligated to repeat them before questioning appellant about 
the Washington Terrace case. People v. Hill, 39 Ill~d 125, 
233 N.E.2d 367, U.S. cert. den 392 U.S. 396 (1968). 
The result might be different in a case where the 
defendant is confused, unfamiliar with his rights, or where 
a significant amount of time has elapsed between the giving 
of the warning and the confession. However, in this case the 
defendant clearly understood his rights under Miranda when 
he confessed. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND APPELLANT 
VOLUNTARILY CONFESSED. 
In State v. Allen, 29 Utah 2d 88, 505 P.2d 302 (1973), 
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this Court stated that it would not disturb the finding of 
the trial court that a confession was voluntarily made "where 
there is substantial evidence upon which the trial court 
could reasonably so find." In Nielsen v. Chin-Hsein Wang, 
613 P.2d 512 (Utah 1980), this Court stated: 
The findings and conclusions of the 
district court must be affirmed unless 
there is a no reasonable basis in the 
evidence to support them. Further, the 
evidence and all inferences that fairly 
and reasonably might be drawn therefrom 
must be viewed in a light most favorable 
to the judgment entered. 
Id. at 514. 
In the instant case the trial court ruled appellant's 
confession was admissible (T.132). Implicit in this ruling 
is the fact that the confession was voluntarily made. Even 
though the evidence presented at trial on the issue of 
voluntariness was conflicting, the trial court's ruling will 
not be disturbed if there is evidence to support it. Palfreyinan 
v. Bates and Rogers Const. Co., 108 Utah 142, 158 P. 2d 132 (1945) 
The evidence in the instant case, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, establishes 
that appellant's confession was voluntarily made. Appellant 
was advised of his Miranda rights on numerous occasions prior 
to confessing (T.29,59,68). This fact coupled with appellant's 
previous experience with the criminal system suggest that 
appellant knew at the time he confessed that he could cut off 
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the questioning by invoking his right to remain silent. 
Officer Afuvai testified that appellant was never threatened, 
nor were any promises made in exchange for a confession 
(T.64,68,80). 
Appellant points out that the trial court found 
he confessed to pacify the officers. This however does not 
mean the trial court found appellant's confession involuntary. 
Even though appellant was motivated by a desire to pacify 
the officers, the evidence establishes that he was never 
deprived of his free choice. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no evidence in the record that indicates 
appellant ever invoked his right to remain silent. However, 
the evidence does establish that appellant made a voluntary 
confession. Officer Afuvai was careful to advise appellant 
of his Miranda rights prior to questioning him. Appellant 
clearly understood his rights and therefore Officer Afuvai 
was not obligated to repeat the warning after appellant 
confessed to the Ogden City case. Therefore, respondent 
urges this Court to affirm the finding of the trial court 
that appellant's confession was admissible. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent 
to Mr. Roger A. Flores, Attorney for Appellant, Weber 
County Public Defender Association, 2568 Washington Boulevard, 
Ogden, Utah 84401, this t/t;:::-- day of November, 1981. 
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